provide for the common defense

John Loftus' Intelcon ought to be interesting. Getting the days off and the money for the three day extravaganza is another issue. But even just the list of speakers and agenda give a lot of information. The Business agenda:

Track 4: Business
Track Leaders:
Joseph Goldberg, Director of Corporate Business Intelligence, Motorola
Robert Christie, The Wall Street Journal
See Track Overview
BN1: What Government and Business Intelligence Pros Can Learn From Each Other
BN2: Identifying Analytical Aptitudes in Business Intelligence Professionals
BN3: Improving the Interpretive Value of Demographic Data
BN4: Corporate Espionage Countermeasures

From the Search Software & Intelligence Software section by Ray Shanley:

-Using identity data to search databases quickly and accurately every time.
-The complexities associated with the often overlooked and underestimated problem space of searching and matching data systems using names and address.
-How identity data differs from other kinds of data and considerations needed when approaching this type of data.
-Common reasons why systems have problems finding, grouping and linking identity records and how to overcome and improve the failure rate.
-New approaches that are proven to work on both US and multinational/international data.
-How searching on text and alphanumeric identity data can complement biometric applications.
-Identity data is not only for people but addresses and items that will not have biometric data available. The future will require both biomentric and trustworthy text and alphanumeric searching and matching capabilites.

Visual investigative analysis software such as Analyst's Notebook 6 apparently have even been used to capture high value targets in Afghanistan and Iraq. Three-dimensional visualization software is available commercially, as well. Interesting stuff.

The Iraqi elections appear to have been a surprising success.

Turnout revised down from 72% to about 60%.

From Iraq the Model, The People Have Won.

From UAE: "Iraqis defy deadly attacks to vote in force in watershed election."

From Iraq Daily, a link to "Arabs Mesmerized by Iraqi Elections." And from Iraq Daily's link to Quotes on the Iraqi elections:

Quotes about the Iraqi elections from Iraqi and world leaders, observers and voters:

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This is "the first time the Iraqis will determine their destiny," Interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi.

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"The world is hearing the voice of freedom from the center of the Middle East," President Bush.

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"It may have been the force of arms that removed Saddam and created the circumstances in which Iraqis could vote, but it was the force of freedom that was felt throughout Iraq today," British Prime Minister Tony Blair.

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"What we are seeing here is the emergence of an Iraqi voice of freedom," Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.

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"They know they're voting for the future of their country. They're voting for the day when they're going to take their destiny in hand," U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

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"The irony is the Arab regimes, who criticize the gaps in the (Iraqi) elections and demand they be honest and transparent leading to full democracy for all Iraqis, are themselves banning such elections for their own peoples," Lebanon's Al-Anwar newspaper political analyst Rafik Khoury.

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"As you can see, we broke a barrier of fear," electoral commission official Mijm Towirish.

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"Iraqis are walking over body parts of a bomber to vote," Rep. Christopher Shays, R-Conn, who was making his seventh trip to Iraq. "Clearly more people are voting in this election than vote in our own elections."

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"It is hard to say that something is legitimate when whole portions of the country can't vote and doesn't vote," Sen. John Kerry, D-Mass.

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"This is a chance for you as Iraqis to assure your and your children's future," Gov. Hamad Hmoud Shagti, of the mostly Sunni province of Salaheddin.

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"Certainly, as a starting point when one considers from where the Iraqi people are coming ... this is very good, this is a very good process," Jean-Pierre Kingsley, Canada's top election official and the chief of the International Mission for Iraqi Elections.

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"This is democracy. This is the first day I feel freedom," Fathiya Mohammed, an elderly woman who voted in the small town of Askan south of Baghdad.

And it's noteworthy that in the only negative comment listed, Sen John Kerry merely pointed out that it is "hard to say that something is legitimate..." With characteristic nuance, he didn't actually state that it wasn't legitimate. Just hard to say. Just saying.

From Arab News:

Nevertheless the very fact that the election is being held, despite all predictions is a defeat for the terrorists and a much needed victory for moderation. The inevitable Shiite majority of legislators must next use their success wisely to plan the future for all Iraqis, regardless of their community. In so doing, they will inflict an even more significant defeat on the men of violence.

From Iran Daily:

Voters formed long queues in Shiite areas and the Kurdish north, where officials said turnout topped 90 and 80 percent, respectively. Many chanted and clapped. Some walked for miles.
Even in Falluja, the battle-scarred Sunni city that was a militant stronghold until a US assault in November, a slow stream of people turned out, confounding expectations.

Simon Trinidad--nom de guerre of Ricardo Palmera--was extradited to the US. Colombian President Alvaro Uribe was extremely helpful. Hugo Chavez, oil-rich Venezuela's head, was not.

The Venezuelan oil-cash-terrorism support seems to be a microcosm of the Middle East. New Secretary of State Condi Rice will no doubt need to add this situation in our hemisphere to her to-do list.

Josef Joffe looks at a what if scenario. Much of the Muslim world and Europe might salivate at the thought, but it seems likely that the Middle East would be no less at each other's throats had Israel not existed. And in this quote, actual history provides evidence of that:

Israel’s elimination from the regional balance would hardly bolster intra-Arab amity. The retraction of the colonial powers, Britain and France, in the mid-20th century left behind a bunch of young Arab states seeking to redraw the map of the region. From the very beginning, Syria laid claim to Lebanon. In 1970, only the Israeli military deterred Damascus from invading Jordan under the pretext of supporting a Palestinian uprising. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Nasser’s Egypt proclaimed itself the avatar of pan-Arabism, intervening in Yemen during the 1960s. Nasser’s successor, President Anwar Sadat, was embroiled in on-and-off clashes with Libya throughout the late 1970s. Syria marched into Lebanon in 1976 and then effectively annexed the country 15 years later, and Iraq launched two wars against fellow Muslim states: Iran in 1980, Kuwait in 1990. The war against Iran was the longest conventional war of the 20th century. None of these conflicts is related to the Israeli-Palestinian one. Indeed, Israel’s disappearance would only liberate military assets for use in such internal rivalries.

In that case, a possible peace between Israel and the Palestinians might turn out to be quite disruptive to the Middle East. Ditto Iraq. But disruptive in the relative short run was no doubt expected by the introduction of elections and representative government. Some disruption is no doubt necessary. Like the lancing of a boil, perhaps?

Henry Kissinger and George Shultz weigh in with their suggestions on the recent buzz of a need for an "exit strategy" now that elections are imminent. A sustainable outcome, not an arbitrary time limit, ought to be the gage, they argue. They offer some questions to guide our end-game:

It is axiomatic that guerrillas win if they do not lose. And in Iraq the guerrillas are not losing, at least not in the Sunni region, at least not visibly. A successful strategy needs to answer these questions: Are we waging "one war" in which military and political efforts are mutually reinforcing? Are the institutions guiding and monitoring these tasks sufficiently coordinated? Is our strategic goal to achieve complete security in at least some key towns and major communication routes (defined as reducing violence to historical criminal levels)? This would be in accordance with the maxim that complete security in 70 percent of the country is better than 70 percent security in 100 percent of the country -- because fully secure areas can be models and magnets for those who are suffering in insecure places. Do we have a policy for eliminating the sanctuaries in Syria and Iran from which the enemy can be instructed, supplied, and given refuge and time to regroup? Are we designing a policy that can produce results for the people and prevent civil strife for control of the state and its oil revenue? Are we maintaining American public support so that staged surges of extreme violence do not break domestic public confidence at a time when the enemy may, in fact, be on the verge of failure? And are we gaining international understanding and willingness to play a constructive role in what is a global threat to peace and security?

The maxim that complete security in 70 percent of the country is better than 70 percent security in 100 percent of the country seems to be a good guide. So does the policy of eliminating sanctuaries in Syria and Iran.

Forecasts for the Iraqi elections:

The Shiite Unified Iraqi Alliance list – 43.8% = 120 national assembly seats.

The Kurdish list – a surprising 36.4% (more than twice their 16-18% proportion of the general population) = 100 seats.

The Iraqi National Accord – 8.1% = 22 seats. (A formula is being actively sought to retain him as premier even if his showing is low.)

The Iraqi Communist party (the best organized) – 1.6% = 5 seats.

All the Assyrian, Turkomen and Yazdi minorities together – 4 seats.

All the rest – 5 seats.

Since Sistani's list will likely not constitute a majority, the Shiite-dominated block will need the support of some of the lesser groups: the surprising predictions for the Kurdish group, for one, and/or the much fawned over Sunni group. The resultant jockeying will likely prove wrong critics who have predicted an Iran-like Shiite mullahcracy.


With much of the coverage of the Iraqi elections focused on security, the Iraqi candidates and the issues have been overshadowed. This may have been largely due to the withholding of candidates' names until now for their own security. But the coalition members, at least, are generally known. The likely winner is Sistani's Unified Iraqi Coalition:

• Al I’itilaf al Iraqi al Muwahad
• Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution of Iraq
• Hizb al Dawa
• Central Gathering Party
• Badr Organization
• Dawa Party –Iraq Organization
• Gathering of Justice and Equality
• Iraqi National Council Party
• Fadhila Iraqi Party
• First Democratic Party
• Islamic Union of Iraq’s Turkomen
• Turkomen Wafaa Movement
• Faily Islamic Gathering of Iraq
• Islamic Action Organization
• Gathering of Future Iraq
• Hizbollah Movement of Iraq
• Sayid Martyrs Movement

Number of candidates: 228

Note: Considered as the main and most powerful coalition. Blessed by Ayatollah Sistani. Includes the two largest Shiite Parties. Leading Figures: Abdelaziz al Hakim of SIRI, Ibrahim al Jaafari of Dawa Party, Ahmad Jalabi of the INC, and Nuclear Scientist Hussein Sharastani. The ticket is mainly Arab Shiite with some very small minorities such as Turkomen. Accused by others of being close to Iran. In reality, it represents the “conservative religious movement,” while absorbing some elements close to Iran’s leaders, such as Muqtada al Sadr’s sympathisers. However Sistani has calibrated the coalition to maintain the “Iraqi Shiite” component in control.

And what would the Iraqi election be without a televised debate? Six principal Iraqi leaders appeared live on Alhurra Television for their nation's first televised electoral debate. Some of the issues:

1. Sunni participation and civil war: All candidates agreed on absorbing Sunnis after the elections with a strong consensus that civil war won’t be allowed.

2. Security and Iraqi War on Terror: Maliki called for new security agencies and popular responsibility. Musa warned of infiltration. Husseini criticized the disbanding of the army. Salih, referring to the Kurdish experience since the 1990s, insisted on “Iraqization” of security. “Coalition forces will stay as needed, but cities should be under Iraqi security.” All candidates vowed to uproot terrorism from Iraq.

3. The form of the new government: Husseini said it was a mistake not to create a federal government when modern Iraq was formed in1921, and that it will be addressed in 2005. Salih maintained that consensus is the basis of any system and proposed a federal state. Musa insisted on a republican-democratic constitution. All agreed on the pluralist identity.

4. Perhaps the greatest consensus was on democracy itself: The six candidates pledged full support to liberty and human rights. They competed as to the means. Maliki prescribed a new political culture based on the consciousness of democracy. Pashaji declared democracy as a part of the constitution, a sort of an Iraqi “First Amendment.” And along with Salih, he insisted that it should be defended by the people.

5. Role of Islam: Candidates had different takes, but most of them admitted it is part of the new Iraq. Maliki proposed to send the matter to the new assembly. Husseini and Salih spoke of the values of religion that would influence religion but rejected a religious state. Pashaji reminded that the current legislation deals with the issue, while Daoud saw Islam as a religion of state.

6. Baath Party: Candidates differed on it. Husseini called the eradication of the Ba'ath Party a mistake. Pashaji endorsed the dismantling of the Ba'ath Party but not the eradication of Arab identity. Salih distinguished between de-Baathification as a purification of bureaucracy and eradication of the Ba'athists. He proposed a “road map to absorb them.”

7. Women: In an amazing volley of statements all six politicians lent support to “an increasing role for women.” It’s simple: Iraq’s female population is the single largest voting bloc across ethnicities.

Amir Taheri summarizes the issues. Mosque vs State, federalism vs states' rights, market economy vs. welfare state, women's rights, the presence of US forces. Ironically, these same issues dominated the '04 US election.

And what would elections be without elections television ads?

History-making, indeed.

After a not-so-brief hiatus due to the US election and a counter-terrorism class and its prerequisite, a substantial stack of stuff has grown on my reading table. These represent just a few of the standouts to my mind.

Seymour Hersh's The Coming Wars stirred up controversy by seemingly blowing the whistle on Rumsfeld's Pentagon. The Washington Post quickly followed up with a piece of its own focusing on "secret units":

Pentagon officials said they established the Strategic Support Branch using "reprogrammed" funds, without explicit congressional authority or appropriation. Defense intelligence missions, they said, are subject to less stringent congressional oversight than comparable operations by the CIA. Rumsfeld's dissatisfaction with the CIA's operations directorate, and his determination to build what amounts in some respects to a rival service, follows struggles with then-CIA Director George J. Tenet over intelligence collection priorities in Afghanistan and Iraq. Pentagon officials said the CIA naturally has interests that differ from those of military commanders, but they also criticized its operations directorate as understaffed, slow-moving and risk-averse. A recurring phrase in internal Pentagon documents is the requirement for a human intelligence branch "directly responsive to tasking from SecDef," or Rumsfeld.

Sounds nefarious, but Defense officials apparently believe they have the legal authority:

Pentagon officials emphasized their intention to remain accountable to Congress, but they also asserted that defense intelligence missions are subject to fewer legal constraints than Rumsfeld's predecessors believed. That assertion involves new interpretations of Title 10 of the U.S. Code, which governs the armed services, and Title 50, which governs, among other things, foreign intelligence.

Under Title 10, for example, the Defense Department must report to Congress all "deployment orders," or formal instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to position U.S. forces for combat. But guidelines issued this month by Undersecretary for Intelligence Stephen A. Cambone state that special operations forces may "conduct clandestine HUMINT operations . . . before publication" of a deployment order, rendering notification unnecessary. Pentagon lawyers also define the "war on terror" as ongoing, indefinite and global in scope. That analysis effectively discards the limitation of the defense secretary's war powers to times and places of imminent combat.

A Washington Post followup article includes the possible source of some of the confusion among legislators:

The defense officials said confusion arose because the program was authorized within the FY05 budget under a different name -- Humint Augmentation Teams -- and was later changed.

The chairmen of both the House and Senate Armed Services committees said yesterday they support the programs.

"In my opinion, these intelligence programs are vital to our national security interests, and I am satisfied that they are being coordinated with the appropriate agencies of the federal government," Sen. John R. Warner (R-Va.) said in a statement released after a private briefing with Stephen A. Cambone, undersecretary of defense for intelligence. "The committee records indicate that the appropriate budget documents were sent up by the department, reviewed by the committee, and authorizations relative to these programs were incorporated in the FY05 bill."

So Rumsfeld didn't exactly red flag the item for legislators, but neither was it "off the books" as Hersh had alleged.

Michael Ledeen sees Hersh's piece as an attack on Rumsfeld and claims he gets it wrong. Leeden also compares Hersh's template of suspicion of the Pentagon regarding Iran to his past predictions on Pakistan.

Given Hersh's record of writing less than favorable accounts of US policy, it's little surprise that he seems to have neglected to drill down a bit deeper on his coverage of the seemingly innocent Iran. Mention was made of the Iranian pledges on nuclear activities, but none of the many accounts of their breaking those same promises. No mention was made of the strong relationship between the Euro Three (France, UK and Germany) and Tehran oil exports and contracts. The Euro Three reportedly account for around 70% of Iranian imports. The percentage of oil that the Euro Three import from Iran is no doubt substantial. And yet Hersh sees no need to question the veracity of the statements he happily includes in his piece.

While Hersh sees US covert missions on Iranian nuclear facilities as sinister, he seems to have a blind spot for Iranian support for terrorism around the world, not least of all in Iraq. Iranian agents were recently captured in Iraq carrying money for the insurgency. Iran has arguable committed acts of war against Iraq, including its role in the assassination of an Iraqi religious figure. Also, reports reduce Hersh's estimate that Iran would take 3 to 5 years to go nuclear down to 1 to 3 years. Some sources, albeit Israeli, give them no more than 6 months.

More-From Max Boot's Digging into Seymour Hersh:

Based almost entirely on anonymous sources ("a Pentagon advisor" is not to be confused with "a Pentagon consultant"), it starts off with the allegation that the United States is planning strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities. I hope so. But planning isn't the same thing as doing. Hersh's article offers no reason to think a war really is "coming."

Maybe Hersh ought to have titled his piece "The Coming Operations."


Update: Michael Scheuer, the "Anonymous" former CIA author of "Imperial Hubris," seems to be right up Seymour Hersh's, um, alley. Tom Donnelly deconstructs Scheuer's predictions, or according to his book, his "Seven Pillars of Truth about Afghanistan."

Interestingly and perhaps not coincidentally, TE Lawrence, aka Lawrence of Arabia, wrote "Seven Pillars of Wisdom." Modesty doesn't seem to be Scheuer's strong suit.

Nor does accuracy. One wonders if Scheuer's predictions are typical of the "work" our CIA has been doing. And this guy was the head of the Bin Laden special group? Good grief. Hopefully more CIA officials of his caliber will follow his lead and become former CIA officials and authors, harmlessly out of the way.



The Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project is out. From the Executive Summary, developing countries such as China, India and Brazil will likely be the ones to watch. Countries and regions involved with energy production and large-scale consumption are already and will continue to be pivotal in the next twenty years:

An expanding global economy will increase demand for many raw materials, such as oil. Total energy consumed probably will rise by about 50 percent in the next two decades compared to a 34 percent expansion from 1980-2000, with a greater share provided by petroleum. Most experts assess that with substantial investment in new capacity, overall energy supplies will be sufficient to meet global demands. But on the supply side, many of the areas—the Caspian Sea, Venezuela, and West Africa—that are being counted on to provide increased output involve substantial political or economic risk. Traditional suppliers in the Middle East are also increasingly unstable. Thus sharper demand-driven competition for resources, perhaps accompanied by a major disruption of oil supplies, is among the key uncertainties.

China, India, and other developing countries’ growing energy needs suggest a growing preoccupation with energy, shaping their foreign policies.

For Europe, an increasing preference for natural gas may reinforce regional relationships—such as with Russia or North Africa—given the interdependence of pipeline delivery.

India's energy sources are not reported much, but China certainly has been openly aggressive in pursuit of its energy needs. It has stepped up its connections to South American producers such as Venezuela. It helped to prevent any substantial international actions against the oil-rich Sudanese regime. And, according to various sources including John Loftus, China was intimately involved with backing and funding the AQ Khan nuclear network in an elaborate nukes for oil program stretching from North Korea through countries such as Pakistan, Libya, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and ultimately for the benefit of providing nuclear technology for Iran in return for assurances of oil supplies and contracts. (While the inclusion of Iraq in this network is still unclear, some reports indicate that Saddam was indeed a part of it. He reportedly "outsourced" his nuclear program to Libya. Hundreds of his nuclear engineers reportedly worked in Libya since it was relatively outside the watchful eyes of the US. Similarly, Syria was operating centrifuges for the benefit of Iran.)

As for Europe, the hopeful statement of the report suggesting an "increasing preference for natural gas may reinforce regional relationships--such as with Russia or North Africa" may indeed turn out to be accurate. But for the near future, their interest seems to focus on existing sources of not gas, but petroleum, especially from one of their largest exporters--Iran. The current "negotiations" between France, UK and Germany and Iran is a good indicator of their dependency on Iranian oil. They seem resigned to a nuclear Iran if their oil supply and the potential for oil contracts remain viable. In fact, a likely template and predictor of events involving the "EU Three" and Iran was their positions regarding the ouster of oil-rich Iraq's Saddam.

If that is the case, it is likely that, once again, the fate of the prevention of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East will fall into the hands of the US and its allies. And finding allies that are not entwined in the pursuit of Iranian oil is becoming next to impossible.